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Introduction: The Chinese Petitioning System 
When it comes to the Chinese government, and particularly agencies unfamiliar to Western scholars and 
policy makers, there is a tendency to portray agencies that distance themselves from citizens as corrupt 
and inefficient, as well as to make assumptions about bureaucracy and authoritarianism. However, the 
bureaucratic system in China has been evolving for over 2000 years and has cultivated a unique political 
culture and decision-making process. Recent studies such as Lily Tsai (2007) and Julie Chu (2010) have 
painted a much more nuanced picture of accountability and participation in this system. Givens (2012), in 
his study of Chinese administration litigation, pointed out that the decision-making process of 
representatives of the Chinese is difficult, even tricky, to understand completely. These studies are on the 
foreground of what is currently being referred by these scholars as a profound political transitional period 
in China, opening new avenues of inquiry for many scholars interested in Chinese politics. 
 
Among all the government agencies, the State Bureau of Letters and Calls (SBLC), also known as the 
State Bureau of Letters and Visits (SBLV), (referred to herein as the “State Bureau”) stands out as an 
interesting case study because of its politically sensitive responsibility and charges of human rights 
violations. This agency represents the core functioning government organ in the Chinese petitioning 
system. In China, the petitioning system is an alternative way for individuals to lodge complaints to a 
higher level of government if he/she believes that a judicial case has not been determined in accordance 
with the law. Through this system, petitioners can have their cases heard, and potentially overturned, and 
retributive punishment can be issued to individuals deemed to have been complicit in the original unlawful 
decision. Located in Beijing, the State Bureau is commissioned to receive letters, calls, and visits from 
individuals or groups in relation to varying issues, including suggestions, complaints, and grievances. The 
State Bureau then channels the issues presented to the appropriate departments and monitors the 
progress of settlement, while providing feedback to the filing parties. While the petitioning regulations 
allow for personal visits by individuals, the tightly guarded office and intensive bureaucratic procedure 
hinder most petitioners from visiting officials working at the State Bureau in Beijing,1 which is quite 
different from the accessibility of the local office, which I observed and is discussed later in the paper. 
 
In some ways, every country has a process meant to function in this way. For example, in the United 
States, if one does not like the way a city level government official interacts with him/her, or feels that 
his/her complaint has been mismanaged, he/she can make a complaint directly to the city council 
member or write a letter to the mayor. However, what makes the petitioning system in China different is 
that it is a formal, albeit alternative, process. Because of the massive number of petitioning cases every 
year, the Chinese Communist Party modified petitioning regulations in 2005, which require the 
establishment of an extremely broad network of petitioning office organs. National regulations require 
                                                
1 Sophie Richardson, “An Alleyway in Hell, China’s Abusive Black Jail”, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013. Print. 
Available on the web , http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china1109webwcover_1.pdf 
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every government at the county level and above to establish a petitioning organ.2 Based on different 
capacities and varying need, at each level of government, agencies are required to either establish a 
petitioning office or designate at least one government representative to receive citizens’ petitions.3 
Minzner (2006) shows that the Chinese petitioning system overlaps with the judicial and administrative 
systems. To both the Chinese government today, as well as the imperial courts of the past, the petitioning 
system appears to be vital to ruling a large country such as China. However, one should note the relative 
informality of this petitioning system. Although petitioners represent a range of grievances, most of them 
seek personal interventions from key, high-level government officials, rather than pursuit of a formal court 
proceeding.  
  
Generally speaking, petitioners who choose to involve the central government have two options. They 
can either travel to Beijing to file a petition with the State Bureau, or they can wait outside a key 
government official’s office in an attempt to get the official’s attention and see to have their cases heard. 
These desperate petitioners believe that the government system has failed at the local level, and that only 
the involvement of the highest levels in Beijing will assist them.  This is based upon the belief that, once 
the top officials hear their cases, they will receive a fair and just decision. Chinese statistics suggest that 
in 2002, there were 11.5 million petitioning cases, while there were only 6 million legal cases handled by 
the judiciary.4  This trend has increased every year since 2002. Despite this reliance on the petitioning 
system, in 2002, less than 0.2% of petitioners surveyd who submitted their cases to the State Bureau 
succeeded in having their complaints addressed.5 According to the Chinese government-owned 
newspaper the China Daily, from January to October 2014, there were over 6.4 million petitioning cases 
submitted to the State Bureau in Beijing alone,6 not to mention all the cases lodged at the local level. 
 
Human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and western media 
outlets including The New York Times have all exposed how persistent petitioners are poorly treated in 
Beijing and the severe human rights abuses they face. According to a Human Rights Watch report, local 
governments hire thugs to prevent petitioners from meeting with top government officials by locking them 
                                                
2	  2005 Nat'l Xinfang Regs., supra note 77, at art. 6. Note that the 2005 regulations require county-level or higher 
governments to establish a designated organ (jigou), while the prior 1995 regulations allowed these governments to 
simply employ designated individuals to handle xinfang work. 1995 Xinfang Regs., supranote 21, at art. 1. 
3 2005 Nat'l Xinfang Regs., supra note 77, at art. 6. Note that the 2005 regulations require county-level or higher 
governments to establish a designated organ (jigou), while the prior 1995 regulations allowed these governments to 
simply employ designated individuals to handle xinfang work. 1995 Xinfang Regs., supranote 21, at art. 6. 
4 Minzner, Carl F. "Xinfang: an alternative to formal Chinese legal institutions." Stanford Journal of International Law 
42 (2006): 103. 
 
5 Zhao Ling, Xin fang gai ge yin fa zheng yi [ Xinfang Reform Triggers Controversy], Nan Fang Zhou Mo [ Southern 
Weekend}, Nov. 18, 2004 
 
6 An Baijie, New regulation leads to drop in petitioned cases, China Daily, June. 16th, 2014,  
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-06/16/content_17590094.htm 
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up in black jails, where petitioners face severe human rights abuses, including beatings, hunger, and 
humiliation7. Luerhrmann’s (2000) systematic study of the Chinese petitioning system shows that petitions 
can be categorized under the following five general categories: community relations; problems obtaining 
public services; economic issues (such as government benefits); political affairs; and appeals of 
government decisions.8 The number, percentage, and petitioning outcomes for each type of case vary 
based on geographic location and office decision-making process.  
 
Despite the aforementioned difficulties inherent in the petitioning system, preliminary research and 
subsequent interviews with petitioners reveals more positive experiences with the system. These 
contradictory views are puzzling and serve as the motivation for exploration of the bases for these 
disparate views. To understand how Chinese petitioning offices make decisions, interact with citizens, 
and the impact of their decisions on individual petitioning outcomes, one must go into the office to study 
both office politics and bureaucracy. For many western scholars, even some Chinese native scholars, 
accessibility to government agencies, especially to politically sensitive agencies, is limited and hinders 
them from studying this topic and informing their research with an inside perspective.  
 
Since 2005, each level of government agency is required to establish their own petitioning office to 
receive complaints,9 thus the petitioning system is (to some extent) too broad for most researchers to 
map out completely. The intent of this paper is not to study the macro level petitioning system, but to 
study the micro-level office culture, state-citizen interactions, and politics, by examining one mid-level 
office affiliated with the State Bureau from an insider’s perspective. Figure1 shows a general petitioning 
system structure as well as the local office’s location that serves as the basis for this research.10 Because 
of its location, not only does this office have to report to its upper level office, but also is also responsible 
for monitoring and managing its lower office. 
 
 
                                                
7 Sophie Richardson, “An Alleyway in Hell, China’s Abusive Black Jail”, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013. Print. 
Available on the web , http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china1109webwcover_1.pdf 
 
8 Laura Luehrmann, Officials Face the Masses: Citizen Contacting in Modern China, 23-24 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D 
dissertation, The Ohio State University) (on file with The Ohio State University Main Library) 
 
9 Under national regulations, petitioning organs and their parent administrative entities are generally responsible for 
handling petitions falling within their jurisdiction and transferring others to the appropriate authorities. Petitioning 
regulations require local governments and administrative agencies to resolve petitions transferred to them as well as 
petitions they receive directly. National regulations specifically require petitioners to raise petitions falling within the 
jurisdiction of Local People’s Congress, courts, or procuratorates with the relevant organ. Provincial regulations 
parallel national regulations in respecting such jurisdictional lines. See 2005 Nat'l Xinfang Regs., supra note 77, at 
art. 6. Note that the 2005 regulations require county-level or higher governments to establish a designated organ 
(jigou), while the prior 1995 regulations allowed these governments to simply employ designated individuals to handle 
xinfang work. 1995 Xinfang Regs., supranote 21 
 
10 This particular office is situated in a city other than Beijing therefore those petitioners who prefer to get their cases 
heard by key government officials in the central government would have to travel to Beijing. 
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Figure1: General petitioning system structure and research site:  
 
 
Methodology  
This study is based on participant observation in one local petitioning office and semi-structured 
interviews with office staff. In order to capture the daily activities of people working in the State Bureau, 
they were observed and interacted with during an internship in the office. The internship allowed for study 
of the seeming banal procedures related to bureaucratic work in China, thus providing new insights into 
everyday government processes. Ethnographic interactions were supplemented with informal, semi-
structured interviews with colleagues. Collection of data in this "natural" setting allowed for a more 
accurate and nuanced perspective on the decision-making processes than previous studies within the 
Chinese government were able to provide.  
  
Inherent in this method is some level of bias and limitations. Although participant observation provides an 
inside view of agency activities, there is an inherent selection bias in this type of observation and the 
study is limited by data only being collected in one office. For example, petitioners in rural China and 
urban petitioners differ in their reasons for petitioning. Rural petitioners also tend to suffer more hardships 
during the petitioning process given their distance from the central government, lower economic status, 
local force containment, and limited mobility. Even in the urban setting, each district office handles a 
range of cases because of the particular district’s history, demographics, and economic state. One social 
worker who works at the office advised that the number of petitioning cases the office handles is not only 
more than those of other office’s, but are also more complex:  
 
“Our job is hard because there are a lot of low income people in this district. Unlike here, XX 
office has much less work and most of their cases are related to financial disputes or legal 
consultations rather than (persons) seeking public assistance. You know, they deal with people 
who are actually educated and have manners.”  
Research site level 
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This social worker, at the lowest level of the office, is able to gather all the information about other 
petitioning offices even if she does not leave the office at all. Therefore, her knowledge of other offices 
may come from gossip, rather than actual statistics. These factors all influence interactions between local 
government officials and petitioners. Further research is needed to examine a more diverse and 
representative sample of offices.  
 
Data Collection  
In the summer of 2014, I spent about a month in one local office every workday from 9:00am to 4:00pm, 
observing daily activities within the office. Because of the pre-research agreement, I was not allowed to 
record or videotape any office activities or interview for security issues and protection of human subjects. 
However, during my over 30 days’ of observation in the office, I was able to interact with the office staff in 
a natural setting, a particularly useful condition that afforded me the opportunity to analyze the language 
used and behind the scenes conversations had among staff.  
 
The Story 
Part I: Getting in the door- it is not just a story of access  
Convincing the Chinese government to permit someone into any agency is not easy, especially to an 
office that receives complaints related to politically sensitive issues. After an extensive online search of 
internship application guidelines, with no findings, my only option was to contact local petitioning offices 
using a phone number found in a community online forum. My initial attempts to get into the petitioning 
office failed completely. In an initial phone conversation with one member of a local office staff, my 
interest in interning and studying the office’s work was met with a bit of annoyance. 
 
“You need to get into our office through a formal venue. You cannot just call in and ask to be our 
intern. We don’t post any internship application online. It’s a government agency. You need to 
find someone to recommend you. Once you get a recommendation letter from someone we 
recognize, you are very welcomed to study our work. But you cannot just call in like this… We 
host interns from time to time. If someone recommends students to us, we most likely will host 
them. Let me be clear, anyone whose position is superior then ours is acceptable. It is the best if 
he/she [reference] is from the state level bureau though. We need a letter with either signature or 
an agency seal. Otherwise, we can’t let you in. What if anything happens? We can’t take that kind 
of responsibility.”  
 
Since the Chinese government is still a relatively closed entity, government officials are justifiably 
concerned with the troubles that outsiders may bring with them into the system. When I tried convincing 
my contact by describing the legal documents in regard to protection of human subjects and ethics, I was 
met with laughter:  
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“What is the point of showing us legal documents? We human beings set the rules and laws and 
we can change them anytime we want. Those papers don’t regulate us.”  
 
I resumed my search by contacting other local offices and they all responded similarly, suggesting that I 
first find some higher-level recommendation. After over two months of networking and phone calls, I 
finally obtained a recommendation letter through a contact provided to me by a relative. However, my 
relative, a wealthy doctor working for a top-level hospital, was surprised and annoyed that I chose the 
petitioning office to study:   
 
“You young people are so naïve. This place is very political sensitive and the Chinese 
government has its own way of doing business; it is not some place that you can just get in 
because you are interested in. Plus, you know about the anti-corruption movement, all the 
agencies need to be very cautious about what they do these days. I would never do it if you were 
not my XX [relationship]. Qian [my aunt’s friend] made enormous efforts to get you that letter [of 
recommendation]. You are a smart girl, don’t get into any trouble, listen more, and talk less”. 
 
Even my relative, who has never worked in any government agency office, seemed to know the rules of 
the game.  
  
Merely getting my foot in the door became not just a story about access to a formal government agency, 
but also revealed two prevailing norms within the Chinese government. First, as the official told me over 
the phone, “we human beings set the rules and laws, and we can change them anytime we want” – it is a 
system where informal politics impact how formal institutions function. Second, the system is closed to 
the outside world and tends to scrutinize whoever seeks access to it, raising personal connections over 
professional relations. My relative, who is not a government official, was still able to get me a 
recommendation letter though her college friend (an individual I never met and still don’t know at all). This 
closed but porous system perpetuated by the Chinese government illustrates the need to research the 
weight that personal relationships carry in the function of Chinese politics.  
  
Informal Politics and China’s Authoritarian Regime  
To study bureaucracy, political scientists have traditionally focused on a government’s formal 
institutions.11 However, in many cases, bureaucrats work under two types of constraints, formal and 
informal. Formal constraints refer to the legal framework that is written down and officially enforced by the 
state (Carey 2000).12 Informal constraints are often the well-established norms agreed upon by officials. 
                                                
11 Radnitz, Scott. "Informal politics and the state." Comparative Politics 43, no. 3 (2011): 351-371. 
12 In China, formal laws and regulations are often too vague to restrict one’s behaviors. 
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Helmke and Levitsky (2006) identify informal institutions by way of their deviation from formal ones as: 
”socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially 
sanctioned channels.” Azari and Smity (2012) further define informal norms as including local customs, 
reputations, and “folkways”. In this research, these norms were illustrated in the lack of any formal 
guidelines and laws regarding government agency internship recruitment, application, and selection 
procedure in China.  As a result, officials are not accountable to any specific formal regulations. But, “a 
recommendation letter from someone they recognize” is a requirement to get in the door. In other words, 
bureaucrats have great discretion in expressing their power and authority, but they are constrained by 
informal politics.  
 
Scholars have recently focused more on the impact of informal institutions because they not only tend to 
persist even while formal institutions emerge and change (Helmke and Levitsky 2006), but they also 
shape how political actors behave.13 The Chinese petitioning system began informally with several related 
actions such as complaints to the palace gate, through the official cart, and at the red stone. These 
actions developed gradually, moving throughout the dynasties from the Eastern Zhou to the Southern and 
Northern Dynasties.14 From the Sui Dynasty through the Qing Dynasty, the complaint systems became 
more formal and systematic; yet, at the same time, the same formal bureaucracy handled both complaints 
and legal cases at the first instance and at any subsequent review.15 In the early PRC, the distinction 
between the complaint system and the legal/administration system became blurred when the People’s 
Republic abolished most of the republican legal system. With the publication of the Regulations 
Regarding Letters and Visits in 1995, the distinction between the two systems became more clear.16 Fang 
(2008) argues that it is perhaps the very hybrid and dynamic nature of these institutions – informal and 
formal, judicial and political, customary and codified, ancient and renewed – that explains their 
persistence, despite changes in other aspects of the state and society.  
  
Additionally, because of the real-world complications with prevailing models of politics, political scientists 
have realized that political actors do not always comply with formal institutional rules, especially in many 
non-democracies.17 The focus of study has largely been focused on the interactions and relationships 
between informal politics and informal institutions. Helmke and Levitsky (2006) developed a useful 
typology, (echoed by other scholars), that informal institutions can complement, accommodate, compete 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
13 Helmke, Gretchen, and Steven Levitsky. "Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda." 
Perspectives on politics 2, no. 04 (2004): 725-740. 
 
14 Fang, Qiang. Chinese Complaint Systems: Natural Resistance. Vol.80. Routledge, 2013 
 
15 Fang, Qiang. Chinese Complaint Systems: Natural Resistance. Vol.80. Routledge, 2013 
 
16 Fang, Qiang. Chinese Complaint Systems: Natural Resistance. Vol.80. Routledge, 2013 
 
17 Radnitz, Scott. "Informal politics and the state." Comparative Politics 43, no. 3 (2011): 351-371. 
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with, or substitute for formal ones (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Helmke and Levitsky 2006; O’Donnell 
1996; Knight 1992; Böröcz 2000a, b, Lauth 2002). Authoritarian regimes are believed to work through a 
combination of formal institutions and informal practices. It is taken as axiomatic that democracies rely 
more on formal institutions, while autocracies operate primarily through informal institutions.  
 
Although Helmke and Levitsky’s typology is useful for analyzing democracies, in her study of informal 
rules on formal institutions in eight transitional regimes, Busse (2010) points out that in a transitional 
setting, where formal institutions are unstable, it is difficult to assume how formal institutions function, 
since these are constantly being abolished, transformed, and established anew.18 Busse (2010) thus 
raises different functions of informal and formal institutions based on resource distribution, source of 
information, and constraint on individual action. According to Busse, formal institutions get their 
information from statistics and stock reports, while informal institutions rely on reputations, gossip, and 
family/personal networks as sources of information. Such conditions are visible in my experience in 
getting access to a Chinese government agency. When analyzing the office activities and officials’ 
interactions with petitioners, the impact of these sources of information on how political actors behave is 
even more salient. 
 
Moreover, as an authoritarian regime governing a large country with a top-town structured bureaucratic 
system, the Chinese central government leaves much discretion in the hands of local officials. In the 
petitioning system, both petitioners who travel to Beijing and those who remain at the local level (seeking 
to resolve their grievances by meeting government officials) rely on the discretionary involvement of key 
officials.19 Minzner (2006) concludes a similar point, stating that because petitioning institutions reflect the 
ability of Communist Party leaders to personally intervene and resolve disputes, they derive their 
influence from the political power of the Communist Party and individual officials, regardless of legal 
norms.20 As such, these institutions represent the rule of man (or Party), not the rule of law, which is 
greatly influenced by informal networks and norms. 
 
In China, where elections are not a viable means for citizens to hold officials accountable and politically 
oriented civic organizations are prohibited, corrupt officials are rarely punished.21 Lily Tsai’s (2007) 
“Accountability without Democracy” studies informal politics in China, ultimately suggesting that 
                                                
18 Grzymala-Busse, Anna. “The best laid plans: the impact of informal rules on formal institutions in transitional 
regimes.” Studies in Comparative International Development 45, no.3 (2010): 311-333 
 
19 Minzner, Carl F. "Xinfang: an alternative to formal Chinese legal institutions." Stanford Journal of International Law 
42 (2006): 103. 
 
20 Minzner, Carl F. "Xinfang: an alternative to formal Chinese legal institutions." Stanford Journal of International Law 
42 (2006): 103. 
21 Tsai, Lily L. Accountability without democracy: Solidary groups and public goods provision in rural China. 
Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
 11 
informality is at odds with the state because informal groups fill in critical gaps caused by the weakness of 
formal institutions. Tsai looks at how village social groups step into the void to informally exert pressure 
on local officials to invest in public goods. According to Tsai (2007), the roots of informality and the 
sources of accountability in Chinese villages lie in shared lineage and “frequent interaction typical of 
Olsonian small groups.”22 The state/Communist Party tolerates these associations because they promote 
social stability. More importantly, securing public goods satisfies demands that may otherwise be 
expressed in disruptive ways.23  
  
Past research on informal politics and authoritarian regimes fills important gaps in the understanding of 
the relationship between informal politics and formal institutions. However, one important question 
remains to be answered: how does an authoritarian regime such as China establish and maintain political 
legitimacy when it is greatly influenced by informal social institutions? To answer this question, one needs 
to look at the other side of the story, and to answer another question: how does the state itself use 
informal politics to interact with citizens, to manage, even control, their economic and political claims at a 
micro-level? Additionally, how do individual citizens interact directly with the state when there is no social 
group exerting pressures on officials?  
 
This paper serves to analyze the meaning of office layout, government officials’ daily activities, language 
uses, and interactions with petitioners to arrive at the answers to the above questions. 
 
Part II: The Office and Staff 
Facing an auto body shop and a small breakfast food stand across street, this local government office is 
located in a quiet residential area with little decoration. It keeps a low profile, with only one sign saying 
“XX24 事务受理中心” (XX Community Affairs Services Reception Center). Formally known as “信访办公室
,” meaning “office for letters and calls,” this office was renamed as “Community Affairs Service Center” to 
play down people’s negative impressions related to petitioning.25 The security guard of the office seems 
to be happy about the new name: “We had way more visitors before we changed name. Xinfang 
(petitioning) is too negative so the upper level office decided to change it.” Adjacent to the office is the 
district judicial affairs service center that shares the same building. These two offices work together to 
receive petitions and provide legal advice, social service suggestions, and policy consultations to the 
citizens. Figure 1 shows the layout of both the judicial affairs and community affairs offices.  
                                                
22 Tsai, Lily L. Accountability without democracy: Solidary groups and public goods provision in rural China. 
Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
23 Tsai, Lily L. Accountability without democracy: Solidary groups and public goods provision in rural China. 
Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
24 To protect my research subject, all the location and personal identifiers are deleted. 
 
25 Interview with security guard. 
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Figure 1: Office Layout 
The red areas, which include the civil affairs service center front desk/reception room, the 
visitors/petitioners meeting room, and the security guard desk, are the areas visible to visitors. Working 
conduct rules, principles, and procedures are well-written, carefully laid-out, framed and posted on the 
wall right next to the front door and are clearly visible to all would-be petitioners. While the principles say 
that visitors can and should file complaints if any staff doesn’t follow the (principles) accordingly, neither a 
phone number nor an email address is listed. Therefore, it is difficult to file complaints about misconduct 
against this office. Mao’s famous saying – “Serve the People” – is posted alone on the center of the wall 
in the hallway, where it easily and successfully draws people’s attention. Since the hallway is not in sight 
of visitors, only staff members are able to see it, and according to one social worker, “it is nothing special, 
you probably can find it in every government office.”  
 
The use of signs and slogans to internalize control are found in many authoritarian regimes. Lisa Wedeen 
(1999) found similar use of signs and slogans by Assad’s regime in Syria, pointing out that people post 
the signs not because they love or believe in the message conveyed by the sign, but because the system 
is self-enforcing and people are accustomed to it. In other words, people have internalized the control. 
The sign indirectly internalizes the idea that the Chinese government office is set up to “serve the people,” 
while the conduct rules are, in fact, impossible to enforce and the principle of “serve the people” is 
“nothing special.”  
 
Walking into the community service center, a large table almost divides the small reception room in half, 
as shown in Map 1, which turns the room into a bank-like setting with staff behind the counter and visitors 
 13 
in front. This layout not only separates the visitors/petitioners and office staff, but also creates a hostile 
atmosphere for the petitioners— you CAN’T go beyond this point and you ARE NOT welcome to go 
inside of our office. Notably, there is no glass wall separating the office staff from visitors, which 
omnipresent in many U.S. social services offices. Four chairs sit on each side of the counter for office 
staff and citizens who come to visit. The chairs are not fixed to the floor and are light enough to be lifted 
easily. During my research, at least two aggressive petitioners attempted to use chairs as weapons to 
injure the social workers sitting across from them.  
 
The main office is located behind the front reception room, separated by a wall. Social workers at the 
reception desks do not have personal desks in the main office, and senior level officials do not enjoy 
private offices and have personal desks alongside other staff. Subordinate staff are rarely assigned 
computers. The rationale for this was provided to me by one head of the office, “They don’t use 
computers, so why bother purchasing them? If they need computers, they can just use someone else’s. It 
is not a big deal”. Although the office desks are assigned, whenever someone with no computer needs 
one, he/she can easily switch desks with others. The drawers of the reception table are stuffed with 
personal items with no labels on them, such as slippers, coffee, snacks, and documents. The reason for 
the lack of labeling is unknown. It may be because everyone in the office is very close so they do not see 
a reason to label their own stuff in a work space, or it may be that there is an underlying agreement as to 
ownership of the drawers in the public space. Regardless, this place creates a sense of belonging for the 
staff not by assigning private working spaces to staff, but by sharing public spaces. 
 
Unlike other government agencies, this office keeps a low profile; however, similar to other government 
agencies, the inside of the office is equipped with air-conditioning, heating, spacious conference rooms, 
and unlimited office supplies. The main conference room is used as the office’s lounge and is equipped 
with a TV, several rocking chairs, high quality air-conditioning, and mosquito nets. The center has three-
hour lunch breaks, during which this conference room becomes a hub for the staff to hang out. They talk 
about the latest news, family trivialities, and new government policies. Some staff members also nap on 
the rocking chairs in the conference room during their lunch breaks. Every other week, over 70% of the 
staff would even go to Karaoke during the three-hour lunch break. Although dealing with petitioners, 
especially persistent petitioners can be exhausting and frustrating, the relaxing and flexible work 
atmosphere and environment causes most of the staff to remain in their jobs. In short, , the office is not 
well designed for intensive work with petitioners. 
 
During one lunch break, a social worker complained about how many more persistent petitioners they had 
to deal with in comparison to those of other offices’: “I know that sometimes, XX office does not have 
even one demolition related case for a week, not like this office. I am sure XX (one long term petitioner) is 
coming anytime this week. It is about time”. When I asked where she received the information about other 
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offices’ record, she replied, “record? There is no record. You just need to ask around. I have a friend who 
knows someone in XX office so she told me”. This further emphasizes that, in Chinese government 
agencies, a significant portion of information exchanged does not come from formal reports or records or 
professional meetings, but through personal ties, rumors, and gossip.  
 
Through interactions during breaks, office staff also establishes personal, trusted, and unique 
relationships with one other. For example, the formal rule states that every staff member who has to leave 
work for personal reasons must submit an absence request and everyone only receives a certain number 
of requests each year. One social worker explained to me how her colleagues usually sub for her so she 
does not have to submit a request when she has to leave. When there is no one available to sub for her, 
she has to submit a request. However, the next day, her colleague would “steal” her absence request 
from the absence request folder, to which everyone has access. 
 
This behavior speaks to the power of agency rules and the work ethic in this Chinese government agency. 
The rules are not set up to regulate behavior, but serve as temporary shields to maintain a flexible and 
manageable work environment. As mentioned, there is no contact information listed for the pubic to file 
complains against the office for misconduct and therefore, office staff do not feel accountable to the 
regulations or to the public. The absence requests are only in place to prevent staff from getting caught 
by upper level officials. When I asked one social worker whether or not the head of the office knew about 
it, she laughed and said:  
 
Of course, everybody knows the trick. Haha, I know it is unbelievable but that is how I can survive 
this job. We are like a family here. Zhang does not hangout with us but that does not mean he is 
dead serious about the rules. He often turns a blind eye to what we do so long as it does not 
directly relate to his own personal interests. He does not bother to sort out all the regulations 
either. What does that do him any good? 
 
This statement is stunning in its revelation on not only how informal politics play out in a Chinese 
government agency, but also because of the very fact that everyone in the system collaborates with each 
other to play this game. Even the head of the office adopts a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in regard to a 
utilitarian use of formal rules. 
 
Zhou, the security guard, an almost sixty-year-old man, is positioned at the front of the judicial service 
center. He has a regular desk with a drawer to lock up personal items such as the tablet he uses during 
work, to watch TV or play games. When telling me about his background, Zhou proudly said “I worked for 
XXX agency and XXX office as an administrative support before so I know a lot of people. I took this job 
because I had nothing else to do after I retired and this office is really close to my home”. It is clear that 
he is neither well-trained nor physically able to deal with aggressive petitioners. When facing aggressive 
petitioners, Zhou does nothing more than pull the petitioner away from staff in an attempt to pacify the 
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situation. When I asked him why the office does not hire a police officer or a trained security guard, or 
does not at least call the police whenever a petitioner gets violent, he sighed and said: 
 
Hire police force for a petitioning office? This is not America young lady. We don’t use force on 
people. That makes us look really bad. We know most of the petitioners, what they want… It is 
useless to call the police since their jobs are just to pacify the situation, which is exactly my job 
here. They [petitioners and police] know each other and petitioners know that there is nothing the 
police can do in this kind of situation. Having police will do nothing but make us look bad. Imagine 
police stand in front of this office, rumors and speculations immediately follows. [That is ] not 
good, not good… ” 
 
From the security guard’s account, it appears that the office is purposeful in its lack of security that can 
actually protect the staff from violent actions. Additionally, it seems that formal law enforcement is not 
considered as a source of protection, but is seen as a source of potential trouble. As the security guard 
explained to me, “why do we want to attract more attentions [by calling the police]? More talking, more 
people involved, more trouble. You will understand what I mean once you work here long enough.” 
Therefore, the state carefully, and successfully, internalizes the idea of a good-will management system, 
not through public education but through daily interactions with citizens.  
 
If the state attempts to create an image of defense and welcome, the second question then becomes why 
does a low-level employee, such as Zhou (the security guard), voluntarily participate in creation of this 
image? One explanation may be that the roots of informality and the sources of accountability in China, 
according to Tsai (2007), lie in shared lineage and frequent interaction among small groups. Although law 
enforcement, such as the police, has the authority and power to maintain stability, involving those who do 
not share similar lineage with the petitioning office is rejected for the potential trouble to which it may lead. 
In other words, there is a lack of trust of institutions and of collaboration, even among bureaucrats 
themselves. Additionally, as Busse (2010) points out, one difference between formal and informal politics 
is that informal politics rely on reputations, gossip, family, and personal networks as sources of 
information, which increases the importance of how individuals are viewed by outsiders. Any slight to a 
reputation presents a risk of damaging access points for informal politics.  
 
Who works in the office? 
The office structures of both the Community Affairs Center and the Judicial Affairs Center are typical 
hierarchical organizational structures with three heads of the office at the top, with secretary and lower 
level frontline workers below them, including social workers and mediators. Figure 2 depicts the formal 
structures of the two centers: 
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** denotes that the person is a civil servant26.  
 
The head of the office is paid a little over 10,000RMB ($1600 a month), the retired judge is paid about 
8,000RMB ($1300), one civil servant mediator is paid 6,000RMB ($960), two non-civil servant mediators 
are each paid 2,000RMB ($330), two secretaries are paid 2,500 RMB ($420) each, and social workers 
are paid a little over 1,800 RMB ($300).27 The urban minimum wage in China in 2014 is about 1800RMB 
($300) a month, meaning that, except civil servants in the office, the other staff is only being paid slightly 
above minimum wage. One would think that staff who take a job with near the minimum wage may due to 
the fact that the job is stress free. However, from my observations in the field, the lowest paid social 
workers are those who have to deal with petitioners’ threats, abuses, and even aggressive actions. This 
observation leads to a question: why would they put up with such low pay for such a demanding and 
difficult, and likely stressful, job? 
 
                                                
26 Civil servants in China refer to personnel who come under the state administrative staffing (bianzhi) with wages 
and welfare borne by the state public finance system.26 All civil servants are managed by the Party according to 
detailed regulations relating to recruitment, appointment, transfer, reward, training etc. Other non-civil servants 
working in the government agency are thus in a payroll system other than the state public finance system, and do not 
enjoy other benefits civil servants have, such as monthly bonuses, family relocation compensation, travel funding and 
so on.  
 
27 The urban minimum wage in China is about 1500-1800RMB a month. 
http://www.wageindicator.org/main/salary/minimum-wage 
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Social workers 
In the community center, four social workers28 serve as the frontline workers and interact directly with 
petitioners on a daily basis. One of the social workers worked for a state-owned company that bankrupted 
in the 1990s so she lost her job and was then connected to the current position through a 
recommendation of a co-worker. Other social workers were also referred to the office by their network. 
Instead of making decisions on-site based on each individual case, the social workers’ primary function is 
actually to collect data from the petitioners and report to the upper level office. The social workers lack the 
power or authority to determine what to do with a new case, despite the fact that they are most familiar 
with each petitioner’s situation. Facing aggressive petitioners, social workers simply step back, being spat 
at and reviled by visitors, rather than calling the police or forcing petitioners to leave. One social worker 
said:  
 
You have to let them talk. People pass by are watching what we do. I just keep telling myself that 
it is a job and keep adjusting my temper everyday,” said one social worker. So what are the 
criteria of hiring and selecting social workers? The secretary explained, “they [social workers] 
have to have good temper, look friendly and nice…. There is no education requirement. Most of 
them are around 40-50 years old29…You know, middle aged female social workers don’t pose 
threat to the petitioners.  
 
It appears that the hiring of the frontline social workers is a well-thought-out process based not on 
individual skill-sets, experiences, or educational background, but rather on the image they project. The 
role of social workers is not to help petitioners in resolving problems since they themselves do not have 
any authority or power to broker such a resolution. Hiring people who look good-tempered and nice 
successfully portrays the government as approachable, responsive, and “serving the people.” Meanwhile, 
because the social workers hired do not need high education and skill-sets, the state is only willing to 
offer a minimum pay salary. The unwillingness to offer a competitive salary forces the state to be 
innovative in how to encourage social workers to do a satisfactory job. One such strategy is to recruit 
middle-aged women, especially those who are close to retirement with no desire for promotion, who are 
living close to the center and are well informed of local communities. Numerous interviews with social 
workers indicate that they also clearly understand the rules of the game. As one social worker stated: 
“they [petitioners] know that I am not the one with the power so if the really need to solve their problems, 
they don’t come to me. “ It seems that it is, in fact, the lack of any real authority or power that serves as 
the impetus for many people to stay in this job.  
 
                                                
28 Interestingly, all of who are middle-aged women living close to the office. 
 
29 The official retirement age in China is 50 for female and 60 for male. 
 18 
During interactions with the petitioners, non-frontline workers, such as secretaries, sometimes jump into 
the conversation to confirm the accuracy of information provided by the social workers. The office staff, in 
all the cases observed, supported the frontline workers’ accounts and the information they provided, even 
when they were not familiar with the cases.  
 
Head of the office 
The Community Affairs Center has two department heads, while the Judicial Affairs Center has only one 
– all three of these department heads are civil servants. The head of the judicial center rarely comes out 
of the main office to interact with staff and does so only if petitioners specifically ask to see him. 
According to the staff, his main job is to “deal with the upper level office.” The two department heads in 
community affairs center differ in terms of their roles, backgrounds, and relationships with the staff. 
 
Zhang, one of the department heads, is a non-local-born veteran and was appointed to head this office. 
Lao Ding, the other department head, is a local. Ding is his last name so people refer to him as Lao Ding, 
“Lao” means senior in Chinese. According to the staff, these two department heads are very different in 
terms of backgrounds, personality, and work ethics. The security officer informed me that Lao Ding is the 
kind of person who gets paid, but does nothing, and is not like Zhang. Lao Ding brings his phone to work 
everyday and watches television shows on his phone nonstop.30 The presence of Lao Ding raises an 
interesting question: if this office is the frontline agency that interacts with the citizens, why would a 
department head be paid for doing nothing? It could be that Lao Ding’s main job is to “oversee” officials 
as this office interacts with citizens directly and receives many complaints directly related to government 
performance. Alternatively, it could be that Lao Ding got this job, like everyone else, through his own 
personal network. I did not ask Lao Ding directly about his appointment to this office.  
 
One member of the staff, when describing Lao Ding’s background, said, “he [Lao Ding] worked in an Old 
City Re-construction Office. When that office was closed, they [decision-makers in the upper level office] 
sent him here since he had nowhere else to go and knew too much about forced demolition case.” Forced 
demolition and eviction in China refers to arbitrary land acquisition that takes land from the citizenry.31 A 
rising tide of complaints by people around the country, reported in Chinese media and posted on the 
Internet, raises shared concerns. If there is one ill-designed and ill-implemented policy that the majority of 
the Chinese population is familiar with, it is forced demolition. As someone who executed many 
demolition and eviction cases, Lao Ding knows a great deal about how this “dirty work” has been done 
and he is now the department head of an office established to help people resolve issues related to 
demolition and eviction.  
                                                
30 Ironically, Lao Ding’s eyesight got really bad because of too much tv watching. 
 
31 Sara Meg Davis, DEMOLISHED: FORCED EVICTIONS AND THE TENANTS’ RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN CHINA, 
March 2004, Vol. 16,No. 4 (C), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china0304.pdf 
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It is counterintuitive that the state would appoint a person who is arguably the most controversial and 
suspected candidate to head such a politically sensitive office. I was never able to get a clear answer as 
to why he was appointed, since I did not have the opportunity to interview upper level officials. It is 
possible that Lao Ding could hold such a position because it is well known that petitioners are unlikely to 
hold any individual government officials accountable. Although Lao Ding is the one with more knowledge 
of demolition history and policy, most petitioners who come to the office for cases related to demolition 
ask to see Zhang. One social worker explained: “They [petitioners] know who actually makes the decision 
here. Lao Ding does not have any real power or influence although he is also the head of the office”. Thus, 
it seems that petitioners, in particular those who have interacted with the office staff for a more significant 
period of time, are aware of the power dynamics that exist within the office.  
 
The other department head, Zhang, always arrived at the office earlier than the other staff, and attended 
a mandatory meeting every morning from 9:00-10:00 A.M. Knowing China’s appointed top-down hiring 
and supervising structure, I was surprised to learn Zhang’s schedule, as I assumed that, as a department 
head, Zhang would be very flexible in scheduling his work. My experience in working with and 
researching these two heads of the office illustrates how the bureaucratic system creates uneven access 
to the same position for staff depending on who is a local and who is not a local. Zhang, a non-local, is a 
veteran, holding a college degree, who passed the civil service exam (an exam that has only about 1.4% 
passing rate) in 2012.32 While his counterpart, Lao Ding, has no college degree and did not pass the civil 
service exam. More importantly, Lao Ding is paid the same as Zhang, even though he takes very little, if 
any, responsibility.  
 
During one civil servant “reflection meeting” mandated by the Chinese Communist Party anti-corruption 
movement, Lao Ding promised to take more responsibility as the department head. However, the next 
day, he showed up to work, once again, with his iPhone, the promises made during the meeting the day 
before apparently forgotten. The secretary explained the situation to me as follows: 
 
 Nobody takes this kind of meeting seriously. This anti-corruption movement will be over soon. 
The President Xi is new so he has to do something to prove his power. Who cares if Lao Ding 
takes more responsibility or not? We are not here to get promoted or to impress the upper level 
office. He is close to retirement so why bother to make his lives hard?  
 
This statement reveals how government staff view the policy set up by the Central government—no 
matter what new policy or movement is in place, it will be over soon, and the old bureaucratic system 
                                                
32 The golden rice-bowl, http://www.economist.com/news/china/21567124-young-graduates-once-risk-takers-now-
want-work-government-again-golden-rice-bowl 
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remains with or without formal government policy. As an old Chinese saying goes -- every policy has its 
own countermeasures.33 In the case of Chinese bureaucracy, officials clearly distrust the effectiveness 
and impact of formal government policy, but they act as if the government policy should be respected and 
followed. To them, the informal bureaucratic culture that has been evolving for the last 2000 years is the 
one thing that is irreplaceable and the one thing that impacts their behavior.  
 
A System with Two Faces: A Bureaucratic Mirage 
 
In comparison to the welfare system described in Joe Soss’s (1996) “Unwanted Claims” and Javier 
Auyero’s (2012) “Patients of the State,” where clients have to wait a long time before they get a chance to 
describe one’s case to his/her case worker, most of time, there is no waiting at all for visiting petitioners in 
this local office. Every visitor/petitioner needs to fill out a request form including personal information and 
details of his/her complaint. The report forms are on the reception table and are readily accessible to 
petitioners. It takes no more than 5 minutes to fill out one petitioning form, since there is only about 3/4 of 
a page of questions. Because of the limited space on the form, and the petitioners’ own ability to state 
their cases clearly, coupled with their limited patience, a large number of petitioners provide a very brief 
summary of the problem. Unfortunately, these cases are returned to the office within a couple of weeks 
after submission due to a lack of sufficient information. See Figure 2 for standard individual petition 
reporting and feedback process. 
Figure 2: Standard individual petition reporting and feedback process 
 
                                                
33 Wedeen (1999), in her study of the Assad regime in Syria, argues that an important aspect of how the authoritarian 
system works is to ensure people to act “as if” rather than obtain their true obedience. 
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It can take up to 3 months for this paperwork to make its way through the entire system to the upper level 
and to be reviewed and responded to. After one petitioner completes the form, the secretary inputs all the 
information into the computer, prints it out, and mails it to the highest-level office. The highest-level office 
then orders the lowest-level office to investigate the accuracy of the claim as well as the background of 
the petitioner. Once the investigation is complete, all the information is reported back to the highest-level 
office to make a decision on the petition. Finally, the highest-level office notifies the medium-level office 
that interacts directly with petitioners of the decision and the medium-level office informs the petitioner of 
the decision. Thus, according to the standard procedure, despite interacting with petitioners daily, social 
workers do not have any clear guidelines or authority to screen and resolve cases. In fact, from my 
observations, outcomes are determined less on the merit of the cases, and more on the type of petition 
and the background of the petitioners, a condition that begs the question: who are the petitioners and how 
are decisions made in this local office? 
 
Decision Making Process 
From my interviews with staff, the decision making process and petitioning outcomes are closely related 
to four factors. First, the outcomes are dependent upon the available budget that can be distributed 
among all requests.34 There are portions of the budget that are reserved for certain types of petitioners 
and the remainder of the budget is distributed on a case-by-case basis. Petitioners who should not be 
assisted can still get assistance, provided there are extra resources in the budget. 
 
Second, petitions are granted depending on whether or not petitioners have any source of income. In one 
case, an elderly woman who could not make ends meet came to the office and asked for a small amount 
of assistance. After investigating her background, the lower-level office found out that the petitioner has a 
son working in a bank with decent income. The social worker found her son and “convinced” him to take 
care of his mother every month. Therefore, no matter how poor and desperate a petitioner is, the 
government will go to great lengths to avoid being the source of assistance. The definition of “any” source 
of income is unclear: the state does not provide assistance to this type of petitioner unless he/she is going 
to die on the street without government subsidy. This challenges the image the government is trying to 
create – that of a stable, thriving, and growing society.  
 
The third criteria to screen petitioners and determine whether he/she get any assistance is whether the 
petitioner is involved in any illicit activities. For example, one petitioner came to the office asking for 
medical expense reimbursement. The investigation of the petitioner’s background revealed his past 
heroin use. Thus, the office immediately denied his request. One social worker stated: “Who knows if his 
medical problem is caused by heroin or not? Also, why waste money on people like him? It is just morally 
                                                
34 There is no mean-tested administration standard for individual to be qualified to get assistance. 
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wrong and unfair to other good citizens.” As mentioned, although the petitioning regulation law says that 
petitioning is protected,35 there is no standard means-test mechanism setting forth who the state should 
compensate or assist. In comparison to the U.S. welfare program that has well-defined eligibility 
requirements, Chinese petitioning cases are determined based on undefined criteria and often based 
upon moral justifications. Thus, any given petitioner’s request can be rejected for various and arbitrary 
reasons.  
 
The last consideration is whether a petitioner is a regular customer or a new customer. There is a 
difference in responding to requests and the decision-making process between “regular customers” and 
“new customers” regardless of types of issues on which they file complaints. New petitioners have to go 
through the standard filing, waiting, and responding process, as shown in Figure 2. Unqualified new 
petitioners’ cases are rejected if they fail a background check. From my observations, all of the first-time 
petitioners seeking financial assistance from the government would have to file applications. However, 
petitioners who have been in the system for a long time do not need to complete forms to get assistance. 
The social workers are keenly aware of what their long term “customers” want without asking them to 
update their paperwork.  
 
These criteria are common among many government agencies in democracies, too. Resources are often 
distributed based on available budget, applicants’ backgrounds, and sources of income.36 Despite sharing 
similar rules, the informality in the Chinese petitioning system and existing social norms lead to two 
fundamental differences in terms of how bureaucrats interact with petitioners. For example, in the U.S. 
welfare system, one social worker would express his/her lack of authority due to the regulations and laws 
no matter how much they want to help their clients.37 However, in this Chinese petitioning office, in a 
number of cases, social workers would tell the petitioners that, “technically, I can’t help you because it is 
against our rules. However, I am still going to do it because I know you, my friend.” In fact, there is no 
clearly defined law or regulation that restricts one’s behavior. This self-presentation not only connects the 
social workers and the petitioners through personal ties, but also successfully portrays the system as one 
that is approachable and humane. More importantly, through this relationship building, the office has 
established a mutually beneficial collaboration with the petitioners. What is this relationship like? Who are 
the petitioners? And how do they interact with the office? 
 
                                                
35 Sophie Richardson, “An Alleyway in Hell, China’s Abusive Black Jail”, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013. Print. 
Available on the web , http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china1109webwcover_1.pdf 
 
36 Soss, Joe. Unwanted claims: The politics of participation in the US welfare system. University of Michigan Press, 
2002. 
 
37 Soss, Joe. Unwanted claims: The politics of participation in the US welfare system. University of Michigan Press, 
2002. 
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The petitioners— it is not just a story of seeking help or negotiations 
Most of the petitioners can be categorized into three main types based on their claims, patterns of 
interactions, and behaviors. 
 
Type I Petitioners: claim for protection/ advice 
Many type I cases are legal frictions related to inheritance and money issues. Some are inheritance fights 
among family members, some relate to division of property in divorce, and some relate to financial fraud. 
Type I petitioners often enjoy a relatively comfortable life and come to the petitioning office for advice on 
issues that cannot be resolved without third party intervention. These petitioners rarely conflict with the 
office staff given that the petitioning system functions more like a counselor.  
Case Study: The Insurance victim  
The insurance victim is an elderly woman who was misled by a bank manager to invest in a 5-
yearsinvestment plan with interest, when it was actually an insurance plan. She spent over 100,000RMB 
($16,000) on the plan, which is well into its third year. She came to office for advice on how to pull the 
money out from the insurance plan without violating her contract. The woman was not asked to fill in a 
request form since she did not ask for any substantial financial assistance, which would require 
investigation of her background. The social worker gave her the following suggestion: 
 
Since you have already signed a contract with them, it is useless to go to the court to sue the 
bank. I have seen many cases like this. Just last week, I handled a case similar to yours (ed.: this 
appears to be fabricated, based on my observation). I told her (the last visitor) to take all her 
friends and families and go to bank and make a scene in public, so that everyone can see it. You 
need to put pressure on the bank. Only by doing that will they give you your money back. I can’t 
promise that this would work but I don’t think you can get anything going through legal route.  
 
I was surprised to hear the “suggestion” given by the social worker. She suggested the woman “make a 
scene” in public in order to put pressure on the bank, which runs counter to what the office tries to protect 
most of the time — reputation. This example illustrates how the government agency staff clearly 
understands both symbolic and real power of utilizing informal venues to put pressure on any entity to 
achieve one’s goal.  
Case Study: The “I am going to kill my neighbor’s dog” lady 
One early morning, an angry woman came into the office yelling, “you have to solve my problem, 
otherwise I am going to kill her [neighbor]!” It turns out that this lady’s neighbor has a dog barking every 
day. They quarreled a couple of times about what to do with the dog and no one wanted to compromise. 
After learning that the woman had already called the police, but they had done nothing, social workers 
provided the following suggestions: 
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No no no, calm down, you can’t kill her. That will not get rid of the dog and will also get you into 
trouble. Do you know anything about the dog? Is it vaccinated? Is it registered? I know most of 
people don’t register their dog or vaccinate them. If it is not, you can just easily report to the 
animal control. There is nothing we can do in this situation. You just need to find something 
wrong with the dog and get rid of it.  
 
Once the woman walked out of the office, her case stimulated jokes and laughs in the office in regard to 
how annoying neighbors can be. However, the social worker who gave her the advice complained: 
 Why did she come HERE? What does she think we can do? Who does she think we are? We 
are not animal control. We deal with people, not dogs. We are not know-it-all. If that dog is all 
clean, she might come back here and blame us for incapable solving her problem. So annoying. I 
should have asked her to kill the dog. 
Working with type I petitioners, social workers tend not to advise petitioners to go through the legal route 
because they themselves distrust the effectiveness of the legal system. Although the state is not a direct 
party involved in this type of petition, the office still attempts to guide and help petitioners to resolve the 
problems they face. However, this response and assistance cannot be confused with accountability to the 
voters seen in a democracy. As is evidenced by what the social worker said after the woman left the 
office, “If that dog is all clean, she might come back here and blame us for incapably solving her problem. 
So annoying,” it appears that the government staff assists citizens not out of duty or accountability, but 
because of the reality that cases can escalate into a more serious and confrontational situation if not 
resolved. The state attempts to control these types of petitions by providing informal and “laymen” 
suggestions so that the problem can be solved as soon as possible.  
Most of the type I petitioners are new and have no previous interaction with the system. When interacting 
with them, the social workers use distinct language and portray attitudes both in front of the petitioners 
and in private, creating both a public transcript and hidden transcript of the issues and their resolution. 
Public transcript, as Scott (1990) defined, is a “shorthand way of describing the open interaction between 
subordinates and those who dominate.”38 In the office, petitioners who come for advice and protection 
clearly depend on the office to help them resolve problems, which leads to subordination. “There is 
nothing we can do” is a regular excuse for inaction when interacting with type I petitioners. In comparison 
to public transcript, hidden transcript is characterized as discourse that occurs “offstage”, and is beyond 
direct observation by power holders.39 By observing the office staff’s reactions after petitioners have left 
the office, I found an important point raised by Scott (1990) about the public performance of bureaucrats: 
“the more menacing the power, the thicker the mask.” Due in large part to the weak relationship between 
                                                
38 Scott, James C. Domination and the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts. Yale university press, 1990. p.g 554 
39 Scott, James C. Domination and the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts. Yale university press, 1990. p.g 555 
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social workers and petitioners (and the dependence of petitioners on the system), social workers mask 
their true emotions and attitudes from the petitioners, while sharing them privately among coworkers.  
However, the dynamics of these public and offstage transcripts change when social workers deal with 
type II and type III petitioners. 
Type II Petitioners: “Demolition policy legacy”  
70% of petitions are related to demolition or “forced demolition and eviction” policies implemented in the 
past few years. According to one social worker, “our ‘main business’ and ‘regular visitors’ are all legacy 
from government forced demolition policy. They are our real headaches in most of times.” Among all the 
demolition policy legacy petitioners, I saw nine of them on more than one occasion. Some of them also go 
to Beijing to petition. According to the security guard, petitioners making claims for social justice in 
demolition policy have their own network established when they travel to Beijing.  
 
Case study: The “You Owe Me Everything Guy” 
One petitioner visits the office whenever he cannot pay his rent on time. He blames his situation on the 
government, which, according to his own calculation, did not adequately compensate his family 10 years 
ago after his tiny apartment was demolished. As a result, his family was unable to buy a new house in a 
nearby neighborhood.  Since then, he has visited the petitioning office regularly. When the head of the 
office was present, he was immediately invited into the conference room and then walked out of the 
petitioning office accompanied by Zhang. There was one time when Zhang was out of office for a meeting, 
the visitor yelled at the social worker, “where is he [Zhang]? I have not gotten my money yet! It has been 
three days.” One social worker attempted to explain to him that the office did not have enough in their 
budget and his request was transferred to the upper-level office, which explained the delay in receiving 
his money. The petitioner raised his voice even louder and continuously yelled at the social worker: 
 
Takes time? I have been waiting for my money for ten years! [You] always ask me to wait, wait 
and, wait, I am not stupid as others [petitioners]! I know that you are all part of this system. You 
can get my money if you work hard enough! Instead, you just sit here, eat snacks, and chat all 
day. $%$#^ [swearing]. 
 
He then lifted the chair on the floor and threatened to hurt the social worker unless he got his money the 
same day. The security guard immediately came in, pulled him away from the social workers, and took 
the chair from him. Facing the pressure, the social workers then had to make a phone call to Zhang and 
told the man that Zhang would come back to the office next day, probably with a paycheck. “I will come 
back tomorrow. You better get my money ready!” Once he left, everyone in the office started a heated 
discussion about his background and history with the office. That man never showed up again, at least 
during the remaining time I was in the office. During my follow up interview with the office staff, the 
security guard told me that Zhang visited the man the next day and handed him a check.  
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Type II petitioners are referred to as “trouble makers” or ”that kind of people”, sometimes even, “people 
who have nothing better to do with their lives.” The office staff tends to have negative views of them. The 
security guard said: 
 
He has nothing else to do with his life. He is that kind of people you know….people who don’t 
have jobs, no income and think that the government owes them everything…..They know this 
system very well. They are smarter than you think. They have been playing with the government 
for so long that they know the rules of the game…they know that so long as they don't cross the 
line, they can get what they want from the state. The state would always pay them. They are 
fearless. You don't know what they can do. They have nothing to lose. …..Even if they get 
arrested, their family, friends, neighbors would all come and make a fuss over it. You know, there 
are too many people unhappy with the government and will seize any opportunity to vent. We just 
have to deal with it. However, they are the reasons why we still have a job." 
 
From the language staff use, it seems that they use “distancing strategies” to convince themselves that 
type II petitioners do not have real problems. Because of the longstanding conflicts between type II 
petitioners and the system, in Havel’s (1978) words, staff “may create through their involvement a general 
norm and, thus, bring pressure to bear on their fellow citizens.” Most of the type II petitioners have been 
petitioning for years, some even for decades, and they are all local. A number of them are not afraid to 
act aggressively when they interact with the social workers. In the U.S. government office, when an 
individual gets violent, chances are that he/she is thrown out of the office, and either faces difficulties or is 
even rejected in later application for government assistance. However, in this office, petitioners are 
rewarded for aggressive behavior against government officials. One would ask why does the state 
tolerate this behavior?  
 
One potential explanation is that, as mentioned previously, there has been a rising tide of complaints by 
people around the country related to forced demolition and evictions, which has been reported in Chinese 
media and posted on the Internet.  The state takes a defensive stance when dealing with this group of 
petitioners. Type II petitioners have, according to one social worker, established networks among 
themselves to exchange information. To cease their compensation may trigger massive unrest against 
the CCP. During this negotiation and interactions with the state at the local level, demolition case 
petitioners see the "certainty" of winning because they know the rules of the game. For example, they 
only use weapons to threaten and pretend to try to injure the staff to make a scene in public. They also 
have nothing more to lose when they negotiate with the government. More importantly, no matter how 
aggressive and demanding these petitioners are, their plights are directly caused by ill-implemented 
government policy.   
 
As Piven and Cloward (1971) point out in their social control theory, the harshness of the relief 
administrators provide is not the result of their personal attitudes toward the poor, but rather reflects their 
responsiveness to organized pressure. If the poor were organized, the relief authorities would be more 
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Out of office 
responsive. Thus, the government agency, at least the one studied here, is very concerned with the 
potential consequences of failing to fulfill the requests of petitioners. This finding is reaffirmed by the fact 
that petitioners are allowed to travel to Beijing with no cost and are rewarded by threatening officials in 
the office, which is discussed later. Thus, at local level, these petitioners are “poor but powerful.” To 
understand how the system manages and interacts with type II petitioners who would travel to Beijing, the 
formal office structure no longer provides a complete picture of the system.  
 
Extended System/ Shadowing System 
From my interviews with office staff, I learned of the existence of chasers and retrievers, who also interact 
with petitioners, but only with those petitioners who attempt to travel to Beijing to lodge complaints to the 
Central government. Figure 3 shows the formal structure and the shadowing system: 
 
Chasers 
A chaser’s job is to follow petitioners who attempt to lodge petitions to the central government in Beijing. 
They stay at home most of the time and do not work in the office. However, once they hear about any 
persistent petitioners’ plans to petition to Beijing, they come up with responsive strategies. According to 
my interviews with staff, there are about 20 chasers affiliated with the office who are mostly middle-aged 
women scattered in and around the same community as the petitioners. They report to the lowest level of 
petitioning office officials. “They embed themselves in the community and only show up when there is 
trouble [petitioners go to Beijing],” says the security guard. According to him, chasers are selected locals 
of the community who know everything that is going on and have extensive networks. Once they hear 
that the petitioners are prepared to go to Beijing, three different strategies are available based on specific 
situation and resources: following petitioners to Beijing; stopping them at the train station (either locally or 
in Beijing); or visiting the petitioners and “bribing” them with 500-600 RMB before they leave for Beijing. If 
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the office does not have extra budget to pay the petitioners, the chasers follow them to Beijing. A train 
ticket to Beijing and the cost of a hotel stay in the city is not cheap. In response to my question regarding 
whether petitioners would go through the cost and hassle of traveling to Beijing if they can get money at 
the local level, one social worker stated:  
 
Oh, because they don’t spend any money. The train station staff recognizes them and often 
would just let them in to avoid making a scene in public. Even if they are not let in, they will just 
get the cheapest ticket. Once they get to Beijing, they either are intercepted by retrievers at the 
train station, or ‘hosted’ in motels or detention centers scatted around Beijing, namely, no living 
cost either. The government is not stupid, they need to know where those people are, what is the 
better way than giving free accommodation and clustering them together? There are places 
called petitioning villages in Beijing for people like them.  
 
According to my interview with office staff, chasers do not use force on petitioners, at least to the best of 
their knowledge:  
 
That’s not their job. Their job is to make sure we know where our people [local petitioners] are and 
ensure that they [petitioners] stay out of trouble on their way. If they dare to cross the line, 
RETRIEVERS will deal with them [petitioners] in Beijing. Let’s be honest, they [chasers] are middle-
aged women. There is no way they will be able to fight a full-bodied man.  
 
Retrievers 
Retrievers are neither government officials nor employees. They use various means to prevent petitioners 
in Beijing from seeing the central government officials. I was not able to travel to Beijing and get first-hand 
information about retrievers. Thus, all the information regarding the role and activities of retrievers was 
collected through conversations with office staff. Retrievers are known by major human rights 
organizations as well as many international medias. Human Rights Watch,40National Public Radio and 
The New York Times have exposed human rights abuses related to petitioners who are locked in black 
jails by retrievers to prevent them from seeing the top officials in the central government.  
 
While new regulations directed at protecting the lawful rights and interests of petitioners were issued in 
January 2005, the petitioning system is at odds with an official civil service evaluation system. 
Government officials at all local levels, including the office I was at, are subject to financial and career 
advancement penalties if large numbers of citizens from their areas are discovered in Beijing seeking 
legal redress. To keep petitioners out of sight in Beijing, but no longer armed with a legal means for doing 
so, provincial and municipal-level officials have developed an extrajudicial system to intercept, abduct, 
                                                
40 Sophie Richardson, “An Alleyway in Hell, China’s Abusive Black Jail”, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013. Print. 
Available on the web , http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china1109webwcover_1.pdf 
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and detain petitioners in black jails41. Therefore, in comparison to local social workers, retrievers are 
certainly less friendly and tolerant of persistent petitioning behaviors. Some staff even refer to retrievers 
as thugs. According to Human Rights Watch’s report, “plainclothes thugs often actively assist black jail 
operators and numerous analysts believe that they do so at the behest of, or at least with the blessing of, 
municipal police.”42 When talking about the retrievers, the security guard said, “they would do whatever it 
takes to stop them there, and they are not that easy to get through.” Human Rights Watch exposed the 
fact that “officials make daily cash payments to the institutions that host the black jails of 150 RMB 
(US$22) to 300RMB (US$44) per person.43 The local staff to whom I talked all recognized the existence 
and role of retrievers, but denied that any office they know at the local level would hire retrievers.  
 
During my research, I did not get a chance to talk to any chasers or retrievers. However, the shadowing 
system, from my interviews with the staff, functions differently than the set up of the formal local office. 
Chasers and retrievers are certainly not as nice as social workers based on how they are described in 
media and by office staff. Hidden from the public eyes, they manage to prevent petitioners from seeing 
central government officials using whatever means available. Instead of painting an image of accessible 
management system, chasers and retrievers focus on creating another image to the Central government: 
a satisfactory public that is well-managed by local government. As mentioned, type II petitioners are poor 
but powerful at the local level. However, when they attempt to make claims to the central government, 
chasers and retrievers would prevent them from having their voices heard.  
 
Type II petitioners, however, are not always aggressive. Two demolition case petitioners, who have been 
dealing with the system for years, did not act violently when they came to the office. Zhang, the head of 
the office, would personally talk to these two petitioners rather than let them interact with the social 
workers. According to one social worker, it is because of Zhang’s special treatment that these petitioners 
come regularly, and they do not want to discuss their issues with low-level staff. All of their conversations 
occurred in a separate, soundproofed conference room to which I did not have access. However, I would 
imagine the conversations they had were very different than the conversations social workers have with 
type I petitioners, such as those conversations in which the social workers say, “there is nothing we can 
do.” When it comes to this type of type II petitioners, there is rarely any offstage discussion after they 
leave. One reason may be the fact that all of the conservations are held in private so there is not much to 
discuss. In addition, everyone seems to know why this type of petitioner comes to the office without 
                                                
41 Sophie Richardson, “An Alleyway in Hell, China’s Abusive Black Jail”, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013. 
Print. Available on the web , http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china1109webwcover_1.pdf 
 
42 Sophie Richardson, “An Alleyway in Hell, China’s Abusive Black Jail”, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013. Print. 
Available on the web , http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china1109webwcover_1.pdf 
 
43 Sophie Richardson, “An Alleyway in Hell, China’s Abusive Black Jail”, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013. Print. 
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asking for details. In one case, when the petitioner left, the secretary just briefly asked, “did he come for 
the same thing again”? And then the whole office went back to an earlier discussion about food security. 
 
According to Scott’s (1990) theory about public transcript and power dynamics discussed earlier, the 
reason why “masking”, namely, bureaucratic performance, rarely happens when dealing with type II 
petitioners lies in the fact that the petitioners are a threat to the office because they travel to Beijing and 
appeal to the Central government to claim for social justice. If their cases were heard, it would directly 
hinder the career and financial advancement of local officials. The almost equal power relationship has 
cultivated an unspoken collaboration among the office and the petitioners to prevent either party from 
withdrawing from the mutual relationship they have established. 
 
Type III Petitioners: Claim for Healthcare/ medical expenses reimbursement  
Type III petitioners mainly seek medical expense reimbursement that in many cases is not supposed to 
be granted. In China, public financing accounts for only 7–8% of public hospitals’ income with user fees 
for services bringing in the rest44. This often results in wealthier patients receiving unnecessary services, 
while poorer patients are unable to access the health care they need.45 Additionally, healthcare coverage, 
reimbursement rate, and enrollment standards differ between the rural and urban Chinese healthcare 
systems and citizens are expected to only go to the hospitals within their healthcare plan. If a rural 
Chinese resident moves to a city, he/she often has to pay a large part of the medical and healthcare 
expense out of pocket. 
 
Case Study: The old street vendor 
Lin is a 70-year-old man from rural China who struggles to make a living in the city as a street vendor 
selling cheap art crafts. The moment he walked into the office, the social worker whispered to me:” oh, it 
is Lin again. He is our regular customer.” During the whole conversation, the social worker mimicked the 
dialect Lin speaks so Lin could understand her better and feel more comfortable talking.  
 
Social Worker (SW): “Hey Lin. Haven’t seen you in a while. What’s wrong this time?”  
Lin: “[Sigh]... You know my situation…I would not come unless I have other means to support my 
family… I can’t do business these days so I don’t have any income. [The CCP was holding annul 
conference in the city for a couple months so street vendors are not allowed in public]” 
SW: “I know I know, I heard that the restrictions will be over in about 2 months. Just hang in 
there. ” 
Lin: “Could you take a look at my wife’s medical bills again? I really don’t know what to do. It is 
too much for me.” 
                                                
44 World Health Organization, Making health care affordable in China, 
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/86/11/08-011108/en/ 
 
45 World Health Organization, Making health care affordable in China, 
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/86/11/08-011108/en/ 
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SW: “I can’t turn these documents in. They are not official bills. Also, these expenses are not 
covered by the insurance. I know these couple months are hard for you. There is not much I can 
do. But I will make a phone call to XXX [the head of the office in lower level office] and let them 
know your situation.” 
Lin: “Thank you thank you, I know you are a good person and you are really nice to me. I wish 
you the best life”, said the street vendor before he left.   
 
After he left, staff all empathized his plight:  
 
“that poor guy, his wife has cancer and they don’t have kids. From time to time, we will send a 
small check to them so that they can get by. No one can afford to be sick but we just can’t 
reimburse his medical bills. We have neither that kind of power nor the money.”  
 
Later the social workers told me that she has known Lin for years but that Lin only visits the office when 
street vending does not make any money. To help him, the social worker made a phone call to the lower-
level office and they spared about 200RMB($32) to help him out that day.  
 
This type of petitioner is “poor and powerless”. The state distributes resources to them so that they can 
survive. Because their situations are not caused directly by government policy such as forced demolition 
and eviction, their cases are very individual based and do not involve claims for social justice. According 
to social control theorists, the elite protects itself and maintains its economic, political, and social 
advantages by a combination of tactics: manipulation and cooptation of the masses by shaping their 
opinions and world view; direct buying off of the population with short-term or long-term but inadequate 
benefits; and use of repressive force.46 In Regulating the Poor, Piven and Cloward (1993) argue that the 
welfare system primarily serves two functions: to protect the social system by buying off the poor at times 
of social unrest; and to discipline the labor force into supporting the prevailing work ethic at times of social 
stability.47 In their view, expansion of welfare benefits and institutions occurs chiefly in response to 
pressure from below, generally in the form of civil unrest. The extension of aid serves to mollify the poor 
and restore political legitimacy both by providing material relief and by conveying symbolic reassurances. 
Joe Soss (1996) further points out that public welfare’s function is not to provide relief per se, but rather to 
maintain the legitimacy of political institutions and the viability of economic institutions.48 
 
A number of petitioners, such as Lin, have established a longtime benign relationship with the staff. Lin’s 
case is especially interesting for several reasons. First, the public transcript and hidden transcript 
                                                
46 Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard Cloward. Regulating the poor: The functions of public welfare. Vintage, 2012. 
 
47 Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard Cloward. Regulating the poor: The functions of public welfare. Vintage, 2012. 
 
48 Soss, Joe. Unwanted claims: The politics of participation in the US welfare system. University of Michigan Press, 
2002. 
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discussed earlier are similar. In other words, office staff truly sympathize with Lin’s situation and there is 
no “masking” when they interact with Lin. Second, Lin is not supposed to receive assistance from the 
system and when he came to the office, he was neither aggressive nor threatening. The social worker 
made a phone call the same day to find assistance for him without him asking for it. This is the opposite 
of their attitudes toward type I petitioners. One social worker told me that Lin has been receiving 
assistance for years but not in a large amount. Therefore, the long-term relationship established between 
them upgraded Lin’s status and treatment in the system.  
 
As shown in what the social worker has told Lin, ”I know I know, I heard that the restrictions will be over in 
about 2 months,” this relationship not only grants Lin financial benefits, but also provides him with hidden 
information only known to government officials. In addition, instead of saying “there is nothing we can do”, 
social workers would often say “this is against the rules but I am doing this for you because you are my 
friend” when they deal with long-term type III petitioners. In a society that places great values on 
interpersonal relationships, by doing this, the social workers not only preserve each petitioner’s individual 
status but also assign them to an upgraded membership—friendship with government staff/officials. Thus, 
the petitioners in turn establish positive views regarding the system. Lin, and many other type III 
petitioners, who live on minimal wages, all express gratitude when they receive positive feedback from 
the office. The role of social workers in the Chinese petitioning system is glorified by building relationships 
with petitioners, providing minimal assistance, and “accidentally” leaking hidden information to them.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper reveals some tactics a state may use to manage citizens’ claims during a period of political 
transition, between times of social stability and mass unrest. Because of the interpersonal relationships 
that are desired in Chinese culture, bureaucrats utilize the relationships they have established with 
petitioners to create an illusion of a personal and helpful system. This paper also provides a different 
picture of how an authoritarian regime controls a population using both formal and informal management 
tactics rather than force, such as the adoption of shadowing system to intercept petitioners who appeal to 
the central government, and hiring friendly middle-aged women as social workers to create the dichotomy 
between “aggressive petitioners” and “nice government officials” in the mind of the public.  
 
Moreover, in the petitioning system, depending on how frequent petitioners visit and how long they have 
interacted with the system, the petitioners gradually build their status and bargaining power with the 
bureaucrats. From comparisons of different treatment of regular petitioners and new petitioners, and three 
types of petitioners, this paper finds that the longer a petitioner is involved in the system, the more 
benefits and information they can get from it. This is not because one’s situation is worse or lasting, but 
because over the time, they have established a personal relationship with the office, which in Chinese 
society, is defined as “guanxi”, a prevailing and ancient culture in which personal connections are used to 
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meet one’s needs. However, frontline bureaucrats, through interactions with the petitioners, have also 
successfully created an illusion of social connections with the petitioners via the language they use and 
how they present themselves. 
 
Additionally, this study reveals that both petitioners and government officials are playing by informal rules 
of the game. Through repetitive interactions with the system, petitioners, especially those who claim for 
justice related to demolition case, have developed their own tactics to play by the rules of the game in 
order to get what they desire from the system. The state and the petitioners have developed a 
collaboration to minimize risks of each side.  
 
Going back to Lily Tsai’s (2007) research and all the past literature on the relationship between informal 
and formal institutions, in the Chinese petitioning system, the question is no longer how critical gaps are 
created and allowed to exist by formal institutions. The question becomes that whether those gaps are 
allowed to persist so the state can use informal means to control and manage citizen’s claims?  This 
paper finds that in addition to having two faces, with one being friendly and accessible and the other 
shadowing to control those who claim for social justice, the Chinese petitioning system is actually a fabric 
that can breathe because all the holes left deliberatively by formal institutions and regulations.  
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